The Widom of the Union Station Developer Selection Decision: The Conservative Choice was the Right Choice

I live in the New York Metro Area where there are more than a dozen sorely needed massive infrastructure projects in various stages of planning and execution. As the economy weakens, many of these projects, which are public private partnerships, are beginning to be scaled back or indefinitely postponed.

Figure I: Rendering of the Proposed Moynihan Station in New York, First Proposed in 1993 and Likely to be Delayed and Scaled Back (Image from www.moynihanstation.org).

The Hudson Yards on the far west side of mid-town Manhattan, The Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn and Moynihan Station (the proposed new Penn Station and Madison Square Garden-see Figure I to the left) are likely to be delayed and/or reduced in scope. When projects of this magnitude and complexity get delayed or postponed, they frequently languish for years or even decades without regenerating enough momentum to be restarted. Many big infrastructure projects like the channel tunnel, which connects England and France by rail, run massively over budget.

Closer to home for Denver residents, the Auraria Campus Science Building had its State of Colorado funding eliminated due to budgetary shortfalls despite the fact that construction has already started. There is a gaping hole in the ground at the Downtown Denver Campus and a great deal of uncertainty about when and if it will be "filled in" with a new science center.

This leads me to the most important public private partnership going in Metro Denver today - the Union Station redevelopment. I have blogged previously about this project suggesting the use of green design ideas, discussing changes in the station design, and the need to integrate commercial bus service on site at Union Station.

Many people were disappointed that Union Station Partners (USPs) lost out to Continuum Partners/East West Partners (CPEWPs) on the contract to be master developer for Union Station. USPs proposed a denser development at Union Station which was closer to the original vision for the site with all of the transportation elements (bus, light rail, commuter rail, Amtrack) located underground in close proximity to each other.

CPEWPs proposed a less costly design with only the bus and commuter rail underground and the light rail above ground a couple of blocks away from the station terminal building. Critics felt this design was too much of a compromise from the original vision, complaining that it would not provide a "world class" solution for the region and that the intermodal transit connections would be inconveniently spread out. These are, of course, legitimate concerns.

This CPEWPs design has subsequently been changed again to move the commuter rail above ground for both budgetary and safety reasons, resulting in even less density at the site and further complaints from critics.

At the time the master developer selection decision was made in November 2006, the project's public leadership argued that level of density needed to pay for the higher costs associated with building the transportation infrastructure underground was very risky. Basically the public sector would be required to make upfront infrastructure investments partially financed by municipal bonds and would have to hope that market conditions would allow for the very dense real estate development to be successfully financed and absorbed to generate enough new property and sales tax revenue to pay off the public sector debt via a process known as tax increment financing (TIF). If economic, real estate or financial market conditions changed between the time the public sector investment was made and the real estate was developed and leased, the public sector could be "on the hook" for millions of dollars in debt without an adequate revenue stream to service the bonds.

According to a Rocky Mountain News Article featuring extensive quotes from then Denver Director of Economic Development John Huggins:

"[USPs], Huggins explained, needed almost every dollar of income projected from private development to pay off the public bonds that will fund a state-of-the-art travel hub. 'If the projected private development isn't there,' Huggins said, 'or if it comes late or if it isn't as valuable, there won't be enough money to pay back the loans. It was like a balloon inflated to the bursting point. One sharp edge and the thing would pop.'"

Since the selection of CPEWPs was made back in November of 2006, two things have happened. First, the costs of building the transportation infrastructure and refurbishing Union Station have escalated and the resulting design has been scaled back. Second, economic conditions have deteriorated. If the more expensive USPs plan had been selected, I beleive the whole project might have become economically infeasible jeopardizing the overall FasTracks Plan or causing large scale delays to the project timetable.

With the benefit of a few months of hindsight, the decision to select CPEWPs as the master developer was clearly the correct choice. Underground transportation infrastructure and greater density is a good thing for a transit-oriented development like Union Station but its an even better thing to have a transit hub that actually gets built and provides benefits to the region. A theoretically great design that never gets built or gets delayed for years or decades or that bankrupts the public purse would not be an acceptable outcome for the Denver Region.